Top to Bottom Reform
Fitzgerald employed a variety of theoretical frameworks, including theories of opportunity and organisational culture, to explain corruption. Overarching these assessments was a political context theory which saw police impropriety as one symptom amongst many of a flawed system of democracy. During the years of Commissioner Lewis, the conservative National Party consolidated its hold on government by refining a zonal malapportionment heavily weighted against liberalminded voters. Patronage and nepotism characterised public sector appointments and government contracting. Cabinet ruled with even less regard for parliament than is usual in Westminster systems, and there were few checks and balances restricting the exercise of power. The police were largely left alone by the government in return for political support, especially in the willing suppression of anti-government street marches (Coaldrake 1989 ).
Fitzgerald's report provided an extensive reform program to establish greater accountability in public life. Recommendations included the establishment of a Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) to oversee police and prevent public sector corruption, freedom of information and whistleblower protection legislation, improvements to appointment by merit, judicial review of public service decisions and review of electoral boundaries.
With the Nationals in disrepute, Labor swept into power on a reformist platform in 1989. Labor's first term was marked by the rapid implementation of much of the Fitzgerald package. An Electoral and Administrative Review Committee (EARC) introduced alterations to the electoral system which brought Queensland close to one-vote-one-value. This greatly improved the first step in the process of political accountability, but only within a system of single member electorates. Queensland had removed its upper house earlier in the century, but did not replace it with an improved system of proportional representation. The state hardly needed a revived upper house, but it needed a parliament which included members selected on a proportional basis for the whole state. EARC (1990) accepted the submissions of the major parties regarding stable government and the value of tradition, with the result that Queensland continued to be dominated by these parties with a winner takes all mentality, and supporters of minor parties were effectively disenfranchised. Labor's demise in 1996 was widely attributed to arrogance on a range of special issues, such as tollways, in which the government, thinking itself secure, was dismissive of public opinion.
EARC's reforms failed to revive parliament as a more effective forum for scrutinising executive power, as Fitzgerald recommended. A major step forward occurred in the creation of cross-party committees and more time for debate, but these changes were not institutionalised in Standing Orders. They occurred at the discretion of the government and Labor also kept a tight reign on parliamentary scrutiny by party members (Ransley 1992 , see also Stevens & Wanna 1993 . Crucial law reforms suggested by CJC research in areas such as drug use and prostitution were ignored. Other CJC reports on enforcement of pollution laws and management of institutional care for the mentally ill showed that there had been little change in traditions of government deference to the private sector and neglect of welfare issues.
Freedom of Information
'Without information', declared Fitzgerald, 'there can be no accountability... In an atmosphere of secrecy ... corruption flourishes ' (1989, p. 124) . Cabinet confidentiality was identified as a major source of protection for patronage. Freedom of information therefore became a key plank in the reforms and FOI was adopted as a major innovation by LaboL But the constraint on power caused by openness quickly overcame the government's desire to maintain its reformist image" FOI became subject to 'death by a thousand cuts ' (Petersen 1995, p. 27) . Principally, cabinet documents and publicly owned corporations were exempted from the Act. Given that cabinet is the true site of government, as Fitzgerald pointed out, this effectively put influences on decision making beyond public scrutiny. In opposition, shadow front bencher Denver Beanland campaigned for wider FOI provisions. In government, as Attorney-General, Beanland succumbed to cabinet pressure to drop the issue (Franklin 1996) . Neither party was willing to put into practice Fitzgerald's vision of an open society.
The Travel Rorts Affair
Arrogance also featured in one of the first tests of Labor's commitment to reform. In 1992 a CJC investigation revealed improprieties in the management of expense accounts by both government and opposition members of parliament, although the CJC initially refused to name those involved. Had anything been learnt from Fitzgerald and the subsequent jailing of several ministers from the previous government over abuse of expense accounts? In the wake of the inquiry the Police Minister lost his portfolio but was later reinstated to another ministry. The then leader of the Opposition, Russell Cooper, also resigned his shadow portfolio and was obliged to pay back money. He subsequently became shadow minister for police, and Police Minister in 1996. There was a perception that both the CJC and the parliament 'fudged' the issue in that detailed investigations were not conducted and no charges were laid against any individuals (Walker 1992, p. 9) . New guidelines still contain ambiguities' regarding employment perks and conflicts of interest (Morley 1997) . For example, in 1997 it was revealed that two directors-general of government departments received gifts such as travel, accommodation and concert tickets from companies undertaking contracts with their departments but neither was in clear breach of guidelines (Metcalf 1997) .
A Memorandum of Understanding
Fitzgerald was highly critical of the role of the police union in defending corrupt police and of the way it had aggressively opposed previous attempts at reform. The Union had also been part of the politicisation of policing, openly declaring support for the government and attempting to remove the reforming commissioner Ray Whitrod . In the post-Fitzgerald period, under the leadership of John TlM PRENZLER O'Gorman, the Union executive grudgingly admitted that the previous system of predominantly in-house discipline was deficient and muted support was given to the CJC. However, this did not stop the Union actively campaigning for the removal of Commissioner Newnham, appointed to implement the Fitzgerald recommendations. Like Whitrod, Newnham was appointed from outside Queensland and the Union campaign in the early 1990s took on many of the traits of Queensland parochialism that had been directed against other outsiders.
The Union had legitimate complaints about the new system of appointment by merit, and q~lays in CJC investigations, but it also opposed essential elements of accountability procedures including the 'double jeopardy' condition under which police acquitted in the courts could be charged departmentally or in a CJC Misconduct Tribunal. The option of resorting to inquisitorial hearings using a lower standard of proof was a crucial strategy to circumvent strong protections accorded defendants under the adversarial system, especially in cases involving suspected police misconduct.
With the appointment of President Gary Wilkinson in 1994, the Union stepped up its campaign to limit external oversight of the police, A golden opportunity arrived following the 1995 state election in which a wave of protest votes reduced Labor's majority to one. The Opposition successfully appealed the result in one electorate and a by-election was ordered. Prior to the by-election Wilkinson met with the then Opposition leader Rob Borbidge and the shadow police minister Russell Cooper. The parties signed a 'Memorandum of Understanding' in which the politicians agreed to a wide ranging list of claims. Subsequently the Union spent approximately $20,000 conducting a law-and-order scare campaign in the Mundingburra by-election., The Liberal Party candidate won by a narrow margin and government in Queensland reverted to the National Party dominated coalition. An ecstatic member of the Union executive boasted of its achievements in a newsletter, thus revealing the previously secret agreement.
The disclosure of the agreement was met with outrage in the media and the memorandum was roundly condemned as a return to the kitchen cabinet politics of the former Bjelke-Petersen government. Borbidge and Cooper had agreed to remove double jeopardy, to remove the compulsion for police to answer self-incriminating questions in CJC inquiries, and to restrict the CJC to criminal matters and return misconduct matters to the police. The signatories also agreed to a major role for the Union in appointing the commissioner, to reduce recruitment standards -with preference given to Queenslanders, especially country Queenslanders -and other restrictions on promotion by merit.
The memorandum showed that the Union 'had learnt nothing constructive about controlling police misconduct and that the senior coalition figures had learnt nothing constructive about open government. The matter was referred to the CJC which appointed an out-of-state supreme court judge -Mr Carruthers -to inquire into the matter. Carruthers was given the widest possible brief in terms of the Fitzgerald reform agenda and his comments during the inquiry suggested the strong possibility of an adverse finding against the signatories to the memorandum. The new government had promised an inquiry into the CJC, but instead of waiting for Carruthers to report, it established the second inquiry (known as the 'ConnollyRyan Inquiry'). Connolly and Ryan demanded Carruthers,.preserve documents from his inquiry for possible access. Carruthers then resigned, claiming the demand compromised his independence. Two barristers took over from Carruthers and were given narrowly legal terms of reference. They recommended departmental charges against police officers involved in the memorandum under a section of the police Code of Conduct related to unwarranted criticism of QPS personnel. It was found that the politicians involved had no case to answer in terms of possible charges of electoral bribery (CJC 1996) .
The politicised nature of aspects of the CJC's operations and of review of the Commission was compounded by criticisms of its handling of allegations against the Labor Party in the lead up to the Mundingburra by-election. The incumbent Labor member claimed that senior party officials had tried to bribe him into withdrawing to allow his replacement by another candidate. The CJC found insufficient evidence but the investigation appeared superficial in comparison to the painstaking process adopted for much of the Carruthers Inquiry (Meryment 1997) .
Organisational Culture
The Fitzgerald Inquiry was responsible for popularising the term 'police culture' in Queensland. Fitzgerald saw in the police an organisational ethos which fostered solidarity at the expense of truth and which encouraged misconduct. Intimidation of whistleblowers and cultivation of neophytes into illegal practices were de rigeur. Fitzgerald cited cultural change as the key to the long term establishment of accountable policing, and emphasised recruitment of a much wider range of people and improved educational standards. Pre-service and in-service training were to offer a broad curriculum with a focus on service and ethical responsibilities.
Some of the recommendations oriented toward changing the police culture were taken up with zeal. For example, minimalist quotas on female recruitment were abandoned and the percentage of female recruits increased to over 30%. Considerable resources were put into recruiting Indigenous Australians and people from nonEnglish speaking backgrounds. Higher education featured much more prominently in the recruit profile and the average age of recruits leapt from the late-teens to the mid-twenties. But insufficient attention was given to socialisation on-the-job and to affecting change in the pre-Fitzgerald officers who dominated middle and upper management. A CJC survey published in 1995 showed that what should have been a residual ideology of tolerance of misconduct remained dominant. There was a marked deterioration in attitudes from recruits, through first year constables, to experienced officers. As Table 1 shows, experienced officers did not take seriously police assaults, police evasion of Random Breath Test, unauthorised access to information, and personal use of police equipment. Police were also very unwilling to report misconduct by other officers (Table 2 ). This is a typical profile for police attitudes in most agencies, but it occurred in an organisation that had emerged from a major corruption inquiry with a priority mission for cultural change. Extracted from CJC (1995, p. A-6). Permission granted.
THE DECAY OF REFORM
The Pinkenba Six
One of the most poignant incidents that came to symbolise poor management and lack of cultural change in policing became known as the case of the 'Pinkenba Six'. At around 4am on a cold night in May 1994, six officers in Brisbane's Fortitude Valley picked up three Aboriginal boys aged 12, 13 and 14. The boys had criminal histories, but no charges were laid and there was no evidence of a crime being committed. The police left the area without authorisation and took the boys in three patrol cars 14 kms to Pinkenba, an industrial suburb with a large area of waste land on the outskirts of Brisbane. The boys claimed they were threatened with mutilation. Their shoes were removed and thrown into a lake, and they were abandoned to find their own way home. The events were revealed in an accidental admission by a police union official. The CJC investigated the incident and recommended criminal charges against the police of deprivation of liberty. In the committal hearing the police defence barrister grilled the boys for hours, shouting at them and confusing their testimony (see Box). Despite complaints that the boys retained many of the traits of traditional Aboriginal society in which court processes are experienced as alien and intimidating, the magistrate deemed them unreliable witnesses and dismissed the case. The Union supported the six officers with all the resources at its disposal. Union President Gary Wilkinson defended their actions, claiming that the officers 'felt hamstrung in what they could do ... it was an act of frustration that saw them take this action to remove what they saw as the problem from the area just for the short term, just to give it a little bit of respite ' (in Four Corners, 1996) . Russell Cooper, then Opposition police spokesperson, supported the magistrate's judgement.
The following is an extract from a lengthy cross-examination of one of the boys in the 'Pinkenba Six' case. Eades (1995, p. 10) asserts that this is a classic example of 'gratuitous concurrence': the tendency of indigenous people to agree to a question, regardless of their true opinion. 
And you knew when you spoke to these six police in the Valley that you didn't have to go with them if you didn't want to, didn't you ?-

Yes. Because you wanted the court to think that you didn't know that you could tell these police that you weren't going anywhere with them. That was the reason, wasn't it? Wasn't it?-Yes.
In Queensland, a group of operational police serving in localities characterised by significant cultural conflict could see nothing wrong with dumping children in a remote area on a cold night, despite the fact that the boys' situation should have been seen primarily in welfare terms. Senior politicians and senior members of the police union also saw this as a justifiable way of dealing with problems of public disorder. Two years after the event, departmental charges resulted in the six officers and their supervisor being placed on 12 months' probation but otherwise continuing in their duties.
Appointment by Merit
In response to the Fitzgerald Inquiry's criticisms of police inefficiency and promotion by seniority, recommendations were made for contract employment. In light of industrial relations considerations and workers' concerns about job security, this was one of the most ill-considered of the report's recommendations. However, it was adopted only in relation to the most senior appointments in an effort to increase performance incentives. The Commissioner, and Deputy and Assistant Commissioners, became subject to fixed term contracts. Vacant positions were required to be advertised nationally.
On the question of performance, it is notable that the 1996 Bingham Review of the Service identified several major failures in management. It alleged that police had failed in the core mission to reduce crime. It used CJC and QPS surveys to show that professional ethics were deficient, partly as a result of the lack of a coordinated proactive strategy on the part of management. It indicated a serious morale problem, lack of corporate vision, retention of an outmoded command and control ethos, and failure to develop professional autonomy amongst the rank-andfile. It identified 'widespread dissatisfaction' with the promotions system and a 'high level of sexual harassment'. It also found that the powerful State Crime Operations Command (modem jargon for the old CIB), headed by an Assistant Commissioner, under-utilised excessive resources, evidenced strong regional biases in service delivery and was 'inward looking' in terms of promotions (Bingham 1996, pp. 28-29, 108, 123, 214) .
Despite this almost .comprehensive censure, when senior executive contracts expired, all incumbents had their appointments renewed without competition. Several theories were suggested to account for this. One was that the threat posed by the Cmruthers Inquiry necessitated the government not appear to be fulfilling the wishes of the police union, which had sought the removal of assistant commissioners (Morley & Callinan 1996) . Another theory was that the government considered it expedient to appease senior police and not to appear to engage in politically motivated intervel1~ions at a difficult time when the Labor Opposition was coming out strongly in defence of police s~nior management (Fitzgerald 1996) . Whatever the reasons, Fitzgerald's recommendations for enhanced executive accountability were blatantly ignored. There was no opportunity for managers' performance to be tested against possible superior contenders. The status quo held firm.
Reaction and Proaction
Part of Fitzgerald's diagnosis of corruption was a link between police 'process corruption' (such as fabrication of evidence and assaults in custody) and a preoccupation with law enforcement. It was also argued that police were losing the fight against crime as a result of over-reliance on a simple deterrence model of prevention. The recommendations of the Inquiry included the adoption of a community policing philosophy as a major strategic re-orientation to reduce both corruption and crime. In the early days of the new Labor government, a policy depleted coalition in opposition had few options of attack other than law-and-order, and it repeatedly characterised Labor as soft on crime. Labor's main response was to try to 'out-Iawand-order' the conservatives. It increased penalties and sentences, promised to remove the sentencing goal of 'prison as a last resort', and promised an extra $793 million for more police over a ten year period. In their secret agreement with the / police union the Nationals promised to advance Labor's commitment to police by a further $300 million. There was no cost-benefit analysis by either party and the commitments occurred in the absence of evidence that increasing police numbers decreases crime. The $1 billion might have been better spent on carefully targeted programs for at-risk young people, especially those in the socially disadvantaged! high crime suburbs of Queensland and in some Aboriginal communities. Instead, many of the residents of these areas will be destined for the new prisons planned by the Nationals and expected to cost $151 million (Courier Mail 26 March 1996, p. 5).
'Community Policing' was the term adopted by Fitzgerald in the search for an alternative policing strategy. This vision of police working closely with the public in crime prevention has come to seem somewhat naive. Nonetheless, closer liaison with 'the community' appears desirable. Certainly the best hope for more productive policing lies with the adoption of 'problem oriented policing' -the more systematic, research-based model closely associated with community policing. Despite noting some laudable innovations in this direction with beat policing and other projects, the 1996 Bingham Review concluded that the QPS had failed to grasp the concept of working in partnership with the community or of an experimental and more scientific approach to crime preventio~ (Bingham 1996) . Annual reports, for example, show an ongoing obsession with clear up rates, despite the fact that the official figures show no progress by this method.
The law enforcement mentality is not confined to police but is pervasive in Queensland's criminal justice system. The decision to hazard the adversarial system and charge the Pinkenba Six criminally, rather than charge the officers through a CJC Misconduct Tribunal, illustrates the point. After the travel rorts inquiry, and unpalatable reports on decriminalising cannabis and regulating prostitution, Labor took an increasingly hostile view of the CJC and cuts were muted. One target was the fledgling Corruption Prevention Division within the CJC which was recommending more comprehensive measures against public sector misconduct. Critics point out that the CJC is dominated by lawyers and police, and that both groups are ingrained with an overly prosecutorial outlook (Woodyatt 1995) . Arguably, the Corrupt{on Prevention Division should be the most prominent division, tasked with the role' of developing strategies for early intervention and long term prevention of corruption. However, the Division remains small, marginalised and under threat, with investigation and complaints handling the primary strategy of the CJc.
In 1994 the Courier Mail announced that the Queensland Police Service was 'clean', thanks to the work of the CJC (Koch 1994, p. 1). The claim sounded very much like those made by police ministers in the pre-Fitzgerald era who turned a blind eye to corruption. It ignored the reports of police abuses -from rape to drug sales to drunk driving -regularly reported in the paper's columns. It also ignored the fact that complaints and convictions are only two indicators of what is occurring. Police are one of the best sources of intelligence on corruption but they are one of the groups least likely to report. A review of whistleblowers also showed a serious lack of trust in the state's ability to protect informers (de Maria 1994a (de Maria , 1994b . Without a system of integrity testing, informants or proactive su!-"eillance, there is no way of reliably identifying the extent of misconduct in an organisation. The ethics survey by the CJC's Research and Co-ordination Division was a major step forward in auditing attitudes, but a similar process is needed to audit conduct.
The CJC's role in law enforcement also makes it vulnerable to corruption. Fitzgerald castigated the Queensland police for neglecting organised crime and recommended that the CJC have a temporary role in this area. Since then the Commission has assumed a major role against drugs and organised crime (in addition to the National Crime Authority and Australian Federal Police) and taken on the macho rhetoric of crime busting (Giles 1995). It established a Joint Organised Crime Task Force with the Queensland police which compounded the already close relationship between the CJC and Queensland police created by the system of seconding police for complaints investigations. Although there may be no evidence of a corrupting influence at work at present in these arrangements, there is significant potential.
What Went Wrong?
Many of the problems that have occurred in Queensland in the post-Fitzgerald period can be related to the lack of specificity in Fitzgerald's recommendations. In 1989 all political parties were committed to the full implementation of the recommendations. But Fitzgerald absented the implementation phase; and the development of many recommendations, such as FOI and parliamentary refonn, devolved onto committees dominated by politicians. Fitzgerald's remarks on police recruitment and training, especially in-service training, were global and failed to map out in detail a strategy for the most difficult task of cultural change.
Fitzgerald was greatly exercised by the intimidation of whistleblowers as revealed in inquiry hearings, and concentrated on creating a complaints handling system independent of the police. It is understandable that at the time this was seen as sufficient for corruption to be revealed. However, as the NSW Royal Commission has shown, the mere presence of external bodies (such as the Ombudsman's Office and the Independent Commission Against Corruption) is not adequate, especially when seconded police play a major role in investigations. Much corruption is consensual and at least ostensibly beneficial to both parties. Organisational solidarity is deep rooted and police are also schooled in how to deflect accusations. A much more pre-emptive system of corruption prevention and detection is needed than was envisaged by Fitzgerald. This includes the more widespread use of the kind of surveillance technology utilised with dramatic success in the NSW inquiry.
One of the fundamental contributions of Fitzgerald was the recognition that police refonn cannot be isolated from refonn in government and the criminal justice system. But at the end of the day the report failed to specify the revolution that was needed in democratic procedures. It also failed to challenge the adversarial system in criminal justice, and the dominance of a simplistic crime control fonnula of prosecution and punishment.
/'
Conclusion
Fitzgerald's report provided a vision for democracy and a vision for democratic policing. Given the long tradition of blighted democracy in Queensland, it is little wonder that reform has been subverted so blatantly. More resources are being thrown into a failed model of crime control. The charge is led by politicians still unwilling to be honest in declaring their policies or managing tax payers' money. The police culture of solidarity and tolerance of misconduct appears to have barely changed.
Queensland is, nonetheless, a different place compared to pre-Fitzgerald days. There are processes in place for the more objective handling of complaints about public sector abuses of power. Government is slightly less secretive. Systemic corruption appears to have been eliminated; and many abuses, such as assaults in police stations and the fabrication of evidence, are now less probable (although assaults are still the most frequent category of complaint against police).
The lesson for future reform is that opportunities for change need to be grasped with highly specific measures that involve all elements in the corruption equation. Policies designed to create accountability cannot leave implementation open to interpretation or reliant on goodwill. Openness mU$t be instituted at all stages of government, and politics and policing need to be seen as extremely high risk occupations for misconduct. Anti-corruption bodies must expect impropriety and go out to look for it. It won't all come walking in the door.
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